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The distribution of gross earnings of movies released each year show a dis-
tribution having a power-law tail with Pareto exponent α ≃ 2. While this
offers interesting parallels with income distributions of individuals, it is also
clear that it cannot be explained by simple asset exchange models, as movies
do not interact with each other directly. In fact, movies (because of the large
quantity of data available on their earnings) provide the best entry-point for
studying the dynamics of how “a hit is born” and the resulting distribution of
popularity (of products or ideas). In this paper, we show evidence of Pareto
law for movie income, as well as, an analysis of the time-evolution of income.
1 Introduction
While the personal income distribution has been a subject of study for a
long time [1], it is only recently that other kinds of income distribution, e.g.,
the income of companies [2], have come under close scrutiny. More than a
century ago, Vilfredo Pareto had reported that the income distribution of
individuals or households follows a power law with an universal exponent of
α = 1.5. While recent studies have shown this claim about universality to be
untenable, it has indeed been extensively verified that the higher-end (i.e.,
the tail) of the income, as well as wealth, distribution follows a power law.
Whether similar power laws occur for other types of income distribution is
therefore of high topical interest.
The income (or gross) of movies released commercially in theaters every year
provides an opportunity to study a very different kind of income distribution
from those usually studied. Not only is movie income a very well-defined
quantity, but high-quality data is publicly available from web-sites such as
The Numbers [3] and Movie Times [4]. The income distribution, as well, as
the time evolution of the income, can be empirically determined with high
accuracy. Movie income distribution is also of theoretical interest because
such a distribution clearly cannot be explained in terms of asset exchange
models, one of the more popular class of models used for explaining the nature
2 Sitabhra Sinha and Raj Kumar Pan
of personal income distribution. As movies don’t exchange anything between
themselves, one needs a different theoretical framework to explain the observed
distribution for movie income [5].
Even more significantly, movie income can be considered to be a measure of
popularity [6]. Seen in this light, this distribution is a prominent member of
the class of popularity distributions, that looks at how the success of various
products (or ideas) in appealing to public taste is distributed. Examples of
such distributions include the popularity of scientific papers as measured by
the number of citations [7], books as measured by the sales figures from an
online bookstore [8], etc. Of course, income is not the only measure of a movies’
popularity; e.g., one possibility is to use the number of votes per film from
registered users of IMDB [9]. However, such voting may not reflect the true
popularity of movies as it costs nothing to give a vote. On the other hand,
when one is voting with one’s wallet, by going to see a movie in a theater, it
is a far more reliable indicator of the film’s popularity.
2 A Pareto Law for Movies
Previous studies of movie income distribution [10, 11, 12] had looked at lim-
ited data sets and found some evidence for a power-law fit. A more rigorous
demonstration has been given in Ref. [6], where data for all movies released
in theaters across USA during 1997-2003 were analysed. It was shown that
the rank distribution of the opening gross as well as the total gross of the
highest earning movies for all these years follow a power-law with an expo-
nent close to −1/2. As the rank distribution exponent is simply the inverse of
the cumulative gross distribution exponent [7], this gives a power-law tail for
the income distribution with a Pareto exponent α ≃ 2. It is very interesting
that this value is identical to that of corresponding exponents for citations
of scientific papers [7] and book sales [8], and is suggestive of an universal
exponent for many different popularity distributions.
Fig. 1 (left) demonstrates the Pareto law of movie income for the movies
released across theaters in USA in 2004. Both the opening gross, GO, as well
as the total gross, GT , (scaled by their respective averages over all the movies
released that year) show a power-law behavior with the same exponent. The
similarity of these two curves can be partially explained from the inset figure,
which shows that there is strong degree of correlation between the income
of a movie at its opening, and its total income. Movies which open poorly
but perform well later (sleepers) are relatively uncommon and are seen as the
points deviating from the linear trend in the inset figure. Arguably, a better
comparison with the Pareto distribution of personal income can be made by
looking at the income distribution of movies running on a particular weekend
[Fig. 1 (right)]. However, the smaller number of data points available for such
a plot means that the scatter is larger. As a result, it is difficult to make a
judgement on the nature of the weekend income distribution.
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Fig. 1. Income distribution of movies released in theaters across USA for the year
2004: (Left) Scaled rank-ordered plot of movies according to opening gross (squares)
and total gross (diamonds). The rank k has been scaled by the total number of
movies released that year (N = 326) while the gross (GO , GT ) has been scaled by
its average. The broken line of slope −0.5 has been shown for visual reference. The
inset shows the total gross earned by a movie, plotted against its opening gross
(in millions of $). As indicated by the data, there is a high degree of correlation
between the two. (Right) Scaled rank-ordered plot of movies according to weekend
gross, GW , for six arbitrarily chosen weekends. The top 89 movies in a weekend are
shown, and the weekend gross of each movie has been scaled by the average weekend
gross of all movies playing that weekend. The inset shows the average of the scaled
rank-ordered plots for all the weekends in 2004.
3 Time-evolution of movie income
In this section, we focus on how the gross of a movie changes with time after
its theatrical release, until it is withdrawn from circulation. Based on how
they perform over this time, movies can be classified into blockbusters having
both high opening and high total gross, bombs (or flops) having low opening
as well as low total gross and sleepers that have low opening but high total
gross. Not surprisingly, the corresponding theatrical lifespans also tend to be
high to intermediate for blockbusters, low for bombs and high to very high
for sleepers.
Consider a classic blockbuster movie, Spiderman (released in 2002). Fig. 2
(left) shows how the daily gross decays with time after release, with regularly
spaced peaks corresponding to large audiences on weekends. To remove the
intra-week fluctuations and observe the overall trend, we focus on the time se-
ries of weekend gross. This shows an exponential decay, a feature seen not only
for almost all other blockbusters, but for bombs as well [Fig. 2 (right)]. The
only difference between blockbusters and bombs is in their initial, or opening,
gross. However, sleepers behave very differently, showing an increase in their
weekend gross and reaching their peak performance (in terms of income) quite
a few weeks after release, before undergoing an exponential decay.
To make a quantitative analysis of the relative performance of movies in a
given year (say 2002), we define the persistence time τ of a movie as the time
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Fig. 2. Classifying movies according to time-evolution of the gross (income): (Left)
Daily gross of a typical blockbuster movie (Spiderman) showing weekly periodic fluc-
tuations (with gross peaking on weekends), while the overall trend is exponential de-
cay. (Right) Comparing examples of blockbusters (Spiderman), bombs (Bulletproof
Monk) and sleepers (My Big Fat Greek Wedding) in terms of the time-evolution of
weekend gross. Time is measured in weekends to remove intra-week fluctuations.
(measured in number of weekends) upto which it is being shown at theaters.
Fig. 3 (left) shows that most movies run for upto about 10 weekends, after
which there is a steep drop in their survival probability. The tail is almost
entirely composed of sleepers, the best performance being by My Big Fat
Greek Wedding (τ = 51 weekends). The inset shows the time-evolution of the
average number of theaters showing a movie. It suggests an initial power-law
decay followed by an exponential cut-off. We also look at the time-evolution of
the gross per theater, g. This is a better measure of movie popularity, because
a movie that is being shown in a large number of theaters has a bigger income
simply on account of higher accessibility for the potential audience. Unlike
the overall gross that decays exponentially with time, the gross per theater
shows a power-law decay with exponent β ≃ −1 [Fig. 3 (right)].
4 Conclusions
To conclude, we have shown that movie income distribution has a power-law
tail with Pareto exponent α ≃ 2. This is suggestive of a possible univer-
sal exponent for many popularity distributions. The exponent is identical for
the opening as as well as the total gross distribution. Since the Pareto tail
appears at the opening week itself, it is unlikely that the mechanism for gener-
ating this behavior involves information exchange between moviegoers. Also,
as mentioned before, conventional asset exchange models don’t apply in this
case. Therefore, explaining the Pareto tail of the income distribution, as well
as the distribution of the time-evolution of movie income, is an interesting
challenge to theories of distributions with power-law tails.
We would like to acknowledge helpful discussions with S. Raghavendra, S. S. Manna,
D. Stauffer, P. Richmond and B. K. Chakrabarti.
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Fig. 3. Time evolution of movie income for all movies released across theaters in
USA in the year 2002. (Left) Cumulative probability distribution of movie persis-
tence time τ (in terms of weekends). The broken line shows fit with a stretched
exponential distribution P (x) = exp(−[x/x0]
c), with x0 ≃ 16.5 and c ≃ 1.75. The
inset shows the number of theaters (scaled by the average number of theaters that a
movie was shown in its theatrical lifespan) in which a movie runs after W weekends,
averaged over the number of movies that ran for that long. (Right) Weekend gross
per theater for a movie (scaled by the average weekend gross over its theatrical lifes-
pan), g(W ), after it has run for W weekends, averaged over the number of movies
that ran for that long. The initial decline follows a power-law with exponent β ≃ −1
(the fit is shown by the broken line).
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